BY:FWAMBA NC FWAMBA.HOW THE G7 IS WORKING TOWARDS SELF DEFEAT

By Fwamba NC Fwamba ................................................................................... If they don’t genuinely work together with a common ideology beyond just a mere intention of defeating Raila, the G7 alliance might be headed for more challenging times ahead. Having witnessed the debacle of the 2007 politics, the leaders of the movement should avoid mistakes that were made by both the ODM and President Kibaki’s PNU campaign teams. After the 2005 referendum, the leaders of the Orange camp decided to move into full swing campaign mode without first defining the structural leadership of the movement. Towards the end of 2006, Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka was feted as the Orange group’s most favourite candidate according to the opinion polls. The then would be flag bearer Raila Odinga featured at a paltry rating of about 3 percent. It was unforeseeable that Raila was interested in the Presidency at that time. The political pundits opined that Raila was unelectable and therefore was only going to re-play his 2002 election role; that of a king maker. The Orange group traversed the whole country preaching and swearing about their undying unity and the leadership pledging to die for one another. They kept that gospel alive through defining politics along ethnic interests. The ethnic blocks that identified themselves with the Orange team were made to believe that political salvation was on the way and it was coming only if they elected one of their own to the presidency. The campaign was made easy through an anti Kikuyu wedge politics. The regions identified themselves with the Orange leadership after being convinced that one of their own was going to be the flag bearer and the eventual victor against President Mwai Kibaki. The Orange followers were therefore balkanized along tribal lines with each group believing that the person from their tribe was going to be the next president. The campaign was different from the 2002 one where the opposition had identified Moi as the problem; thus it was not that hard because majority of Kenyans were fed up with Moi leadership. In 2002, the opposition had survived a potential stalemate when Raila endorsed Kibaki publicly. The move was aimed at ensuring that Moi’s preferred successor; Uhuru Kenyatta lost election.Raila’s endorsement of Kibaki had to do with more interest in Uhuru’s loss than in Kibaki’s victory. The unity of the opposition was the only way to defeat Moi’s preferred candidate. The move was based on the lessons of the 1992 and 1997 where multiple opposition candidature had caused Moi to win and rule with minority victories. The 2007 unity of the Orange party became at stake when it became evident that Raila was no longer interested in playing the Kingmaker. He wanted to be the King himself. This happened when many pundits had already pointed out that Kalonzo was the most preferred Orange flag bearer. Since the Orange campaign had been defined by ethnic balkanization, the Kamba community where Kalonzo comes from was confident that one of their own with Raila’s endorsement was the undisputable Kibaki successor .The Luhya under Mudavadi hoped for the same. When Raila’s bid for the presidency became more pronounced, the Kamba community and Kalonzo felt betrayed. They had all banked on a Raila endorsement. For that reason, the orange party had to split and thus become weak. It was good riddance for the Raila group when Kalonzo parted with the team because they had started viewing him as an obstacle to a Raila presidency. Kalonzo had to run for presidency because he believed that the opinion polls had indicated he was the favourite candidate for the orange group while Raila believed that he was the leader of the group and there was no way he was going to play a second fiddle. In the 2007 campaigns Raila enjoyed the popularity that he may never enjoy again in his lifetime. He and his group had high confidence levels that he was going to win. The Raila Orange group (now ODM) downplayed the fact that Kalonzo’s departure had fatally destroyed their chance to defeat President Kibaki. While the Orange group split, President Kibaki’s group was making their own blunders. The Kibaki campaign was disorganized all through and lacked leadership. It appeared directionless and remained poor in strategy. The biggest mistake the Kibaki campaign made was living with a notion that Raila was unelectable. They appeared content that Raila was not going to have any numerical strength enough to pose threat to the president’s bid to serve for a second term. The campaign went on without a political party structure. The campaign lived with a notion that there was no need to invest in strategy because the election was going to be a walk over. This reluctance almost made the president party-less until when PNU was formed two months to the general election. The late formation of the President’s party had repercussions because this was a totally new brand that had to be marketed on a crush program. It’s obvious that if either side avoided such mistakes, the clarity of the margin of victory of the 2007 election would have been seen and thus we wouldn’t have had the Post Election violence. The G7 alliance appears to be capable of garnering the support of the people. However; it appears that the G7 alliance is becoming more pronounced in combining the 2007 mistakes of the Orange group and PNU. Instead of taking advantage of the disintegration of ODM, they are busy undermining each other. Everyone is trying to outsmart another while playing with some hidden cards under the table. The group leadership should avoid eminent crisis. For them to hold together; mutual respect needs to prevail. Every vote counts and supporters of every candidate need to be respected. There must be clear appreciation of the fact that every vote counts and without that vote, defeat is on the way. The internal wedge politics by treating others as inferior partners will only give victory to Raila.Most importantly, the group needs to look for a formula of making the structure of leadership operational so that there will be no cry of foul play and short-changing at the last minute; that may likely lead to fall outs. The supporters of every leader need to know their position in advance; be explained to so that the feelings of betrayal do not arise. There must be a formula of accommodating most if not all the interests. The group also needs to define a political ideology beyond just opposing and stopping a Raila presidency. That can only happen in an organized environment. The group can only survive if they cement a modus operandi that is selfless. Sentiments that appear selfish will only work towards the disintegration of the group. If this trust is not established now, relying on a run off as a way of ensuring the defeat of Raila might not be the case since disintegration of the group after the first vote may not be ruled out. On the recent opinion polls that were released by a Nairobi based firm; the Strategic Research, I find it legitimate to ask why the polls were held, in whose interests were they held and at whose expense. On whether the results were skewed to favour a certain pattern or individual is a different story altogether. While I also question the method used to arrive at the 35 counties that were sampled in the survey, it’s important that the G7 alliance look at it as a warning sign and put their house in order. Politics is dynamic and their continued disorganisation may only give more ammunition to their disgraced opponent. The other most likely situation is that another force with a defined ideology might easily take advantage of the confusion and arise to defeat the established candidates. What the new group will only need is to establish a voter friendly form of wedge politics; the politics of ‘us vs them’. Fwamba NC Fwamba +254721779445 Box 41046;Nairobi.